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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LE ROY SWEAT AND VIRGINIA M.
SWEAT, ADMINISTRITRIX OF THE'
ESTA TE OF BLAINE ORVEL
SWEAT, DECEASED,
VS.

Appelwnts

Case No. 11,596

REX T. FUHRIMAN, CRAIG
IWHRIMAN, JAMES H. MADDOX
and DAN ALLISON,

ReS'[Jondents

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the Order for Summary Judgment of the
District Court of Wasatch County,
Hon. Maurice Harding, District Judge
STATEMENT OF KIND
OF CASE
,
This is an action1 for wrongful death brought by the
parents of the deceased, Blaine Orvel Sweat.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The respective parties all filed motions for summary
judgment and the court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the
defendants.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have their motion for summary
judgment granted or that the matter be sent back for trial.

STATEMENT OF FACT
Appellants contend that on Saturday night, May 18,
1968, defendant Craig Fuhriman, age 21, and the son of
Defendant Rex T. Fuhriman1 who was also the owner of
the car Craig was driving, was returning from a fishing
trip to Flaming Gorge with David Lund as his companion.
They ran out of gas on Highway US 40 about 22 miles East
of Heber City, Utah, at approximately 11:00 p.m.
This is the spot where the accident later happened.
The road is generally straight and level in each direction.
Toward the East there was visability from the stalled car
for about one and six-tenths (1.6) miles and toward the
West there was visability for approximately one-half mile.
The highway was divided into two lanes by paint marks
down the center. At this time of night the traffic was light
and the weather was clear and the road dry.
Defendanrt Craig Fuhriman and Lund hitched a ride
to Heber City. No lights were left burning on the Fuhriman
vehicle. They stopped at a Conoco station and asked the
attendant for help in getting gas for their car.
Defendant James H. Maddox had taken the family
car and gone to Price. He left a Jeep with his son, Steven
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Maddox. Steven loaned the Jeep to Rickie Lee Allison, a
sixteen year old boy and brother-in-law of James H.
Maddox.
Rickie Lee Allison and Blaine Orvel Sweat, also sixteen
years of age, had been! to the local high school dance and
stopped at a cafe adjacent to the service station. The station attendant asked Allison to assist Fuhriman. Allison
agreed but indicated they would first have to take their
dates home. This was done and Allison and Sweat returned
to the Conoco station but there was no gas can at the station which could be used to transport gas.
The four boys then went in the Maddox Jeep, with Allison driving, to a service station at the Strawberry Junction,
passing the Fuhriman vehicle on the way. There they
awoke the attendant but he also did not have a gas can.
The Allison boy said he had a second gas tank on the Jeep.
Fuhriman then purchased $2.00 worth of gasoline which
was put in the second gas tank. The four then returned,
Allison driving, to the Fuhriman car. They went past it a
short distance, made a U turn and returned and parked
parallel with the Fuhriman car so the gas tanks were even.
The Fuhriman vehicle was facing West toward Heber City
and the Maddox Jeep was facing East toward Vernal.
There is a dispute as to whether the Fuhriman! car was
completely off the black-top of the road or whether the left
wheels were on the paved portion. The Jeep was in the
West lane of traffic facing on-coming traffic. Four yellow
blinker lights on the Jeep were turned on and its head
lights were on bright. There were about two or three feet
between the two parked vehicles. Craig FuhrimanJ got out
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of the back end of the Jeep to watch for on-coming traffic.
The Allison boy started to siphon gas out but got his
mouth full of gas and started to cough and choke. Sweat
then picked up the siphone hose, and while standing between the two vehicles started to siphon gas from one
car to the other.
It was now early Sunday morning, May 19, 1968. The

party of four had been there about five minutes when a car
driven by Mr. Sargent ran into the two parked vehicles.
Allison was killed outright and Sweat lived a few days in
a hospital before dying. He never regained consciousness
enough to talk. Fuhriman and Lund were also injured but
have recovered.

POINT I
DEFEDANT DAN ALLISON IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGIDNCE OF RICKIE LEE ALLISON.
Dan Allison signed the drivers license of his son,
Rickie Lee Allison. Thus under the provisions of Section
41-2-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, he is liable for Rickie's
conduct in the operation of the Jeep.

POINT II
RICKIE LEE ALLISON'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE
CAUSE OF THE INJURY AND DEATH OF BLAINE OR·
VELSWEAT.

5

Rickie Lee Allison was the driver at all times of the
Jeep and he is the one who agreed to help the stranded
motorists. The depositions reveal that the Sweat boy never
at any time agreed to any action or conduct of Fuhriman
or Allison. He was an innocent bystander caught in a situation where common courtesy demands and requires that
he does not interfere with the help requested by Fuhriman.
Allison parked the Jeep on a highway blocking a lane
of traffic. Allison turned the Jeep to face on-coming traffic
with four yellow blinker lights and the head lights on
bright. (See the deposition of Trooper Giles, page (9), lines
(15) through (17), and a statement of Harold J. Sargent.
Allison failed to give any warning to approaching
traffic. The road was straight for 1.6 miles (Deposition of
Trooper Giles, page (26) lines (1) through (5). This would
give time to signal on-coming traffic or for a driver to see
any signal of warning properly given.

POINT III
THE GUEST STATUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS
CASE.
The guest statute applies to persons riding in a motor
vehicle. This is repeated time and again in the statute,
Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Some cases have extended the statute to cover mounting and alighting from a motor vehicle but none have ex-
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tended it so far as to include a fact situation like the present case. The journey for the time had ended, all occupants
were out of the vehicle and had embarked on another
venture. This activity was unrelated to riding in a car. No
guest vehicle was moving.

POINT IV
CRAIG FUHRIMAN'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE CAUSE
OF THE INJURY AND DEATH OF BLAINE ORVEL
SWEAT.
The negligence of Craig Fuhriman which contributed
to the injury and death of Blaine Orvel Sweat can be summarized as follows:
1. Although he was an experienced driver he ran out

of gas on a main arterial highway. (His deposition Page 13,
lines 14 through 17.)

2. Left wheels of his car were parked on the black top
portion of the highway when the car was abandoned. (Deposition of Trooper Giles, Page 9, lines 9 through 11, Page
15, lines 15 through 25, Page 16, lines 1 through 5.)
3. No lights were left on the car at any time. (His deposition, Page 44, lines 13 through 15.)
4. Knew how gasoline was to be siphoned from one
motor vehicle to another and did not object. (His deposition
Page 95, lines 14 through 22.)
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5. Permitted a sixteen year old driver to park on the
wrong side of the highway facing on-coming traffic. (His
deposition Page 56, lines 20 and 21.)
6. Failed to put out any warning signals or devices
of any kind. (His deposition Page 59, lines 1 through is,
Page 96 lines 20 through 25 and Page 97, lines 1 through

16.)

7. After the Jeep was stopped he stood to the rear of
the Jeep to observe traffic. (His deposition Page 44, line
11.)

8. He failed to observe on-coming traffic as soon as he

should have done under the circumstances. (His deposition
Page 78, lines 22 through 25, and Page 79, lines one and
two.)
9. Failed to inform approaching traffic of the dangerously parked vehicles. (His deposition Page 27, lines 2
through 6.)
10 He permitted the traffic approaching the parked
vehicles to approach so close before giving warning that
he was able to run only a couple of steps before he was
struck by the Jeep which had been hit by the Sargent car.
(His deposition, Page 38, lines 3 and 4.)
"Failure to observe is negligence proximately contributing to harm where, by observing, driver
have avoided or lessened resulting harm."

Morris v. Christensen, 356 P2d, 34; 11U2d140.

8

"A motorist's duty of lookout is not fulfilled by
merely taking a quick glance, or none."

Hughes v. Hooper, 431 P2d 983, 19 Utah 2d 389.

POINT V
CRAIG FUHRIMAN IS LIABLE FOR THE INJURY
AND DEATH OF BLAINE ORVEL SWEAT UNDER
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE.
All the elements of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
are present in this case.
Sweat was in a position of peril. He could not see the
on-coming car lights. See affidavit of Ranquist.
Defendant Craig F)Ihriman was watching for on-coming traffic (his deposition, page 44, line 11) but he failed
to give a warning in time. He himself was only able to run
a couple of steps (his deposition, page 38, line 4) before he
was hit by the Jeep which had been struck by the Sargent
car.
Blaine Sweat was struck by the Sargent vehicle while
standing between the vehicles trying to syphon gas into
the Fuhriman car and died as a result of the injuries.
Mr. Fuhriman was twenty-one (21) years of age with
five (5) years of driving experience, driving his father's
automobile. He had contributed to the dangerous situation,
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but he, alone, had the Last Clear Chance to avoid the accident by giving adequate warning of approach of the Sargent vehicle from the East, this he failed to do. The Allison
boy, having a mouth full of gas, was clearing his mouth and
nose of the gas and its fumes. Blaine Orvel Sweat was concentrating on syphoning gas, but Craig Fuhriman and his
passenger were standing looking to the East toward the
approaching car with a full knowledge of the peril of
Blaine Sweat. Such conduct is a breach of the Doctrine of
Last Clear Chance.
Section 480 of the Retatement of Torts states the provisions of the Last Clear Chance, such as are applicable in
this case, as follows:
"A plaintiff, who, by the exercise of reasonable
vigilance could have observed the danger created
by the defendant's negligence in time to have avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, but only if the
defendant (a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and
(b) realized or had reason to realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the harm, and (c)
thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence his then existing
ability to avoid harming the plaintiff."
The terminology of his Section has been adopted by
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
Graham v. Johnson, 166 P, 2d 230;
Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 120 Utah 453;

235 P. 2d 515.
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A complete discussion of the Doctrine of Last Clear
Chance and its application is found in 92 ALR 47, supplemented in 119 ALR 1041, and 171 ALR 365.
In the case of Graham v. Johnson, 169 P. 2d 230, at
Page 238, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah stated:
" ... In situations where reasonable minds must all
come to the conclusion that a defendant had ample
opportunity to utilize an existing ability to avoid
harm to the plaintiff the court should direct averdict for the plaintiff; in situations where reasonable
minds must all conclude that a defendant did not
have such opportunity the verdict should be directed for the defendant... "
It is claimed that Blaine Sweat was negligent in plac-

ing himself between the two automobiles to siphon gas or
negligent in failing to see the approaching Sargent car, assuming but not admitting the negligence of Sweat, the
subsequent negligence of Craig Fuhriman brings the humanitarian Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance into being.
"Even though a plaintiff was negligent, if defendant
had last clear chance to avoid accident, plaintiff was
entitled to recover damages, notwithstanding his
own negligence.
"Plaintiff may recover, notwithstanding his own
negligence if he is in a situation of inextricable
peril and defendant either knows, or in the exercise
of reasonable care should know of such peril, and
thereafter has a clear opportunity to avoid the injury or fails to do so, since under such circumstances
plaintiff's negligence has in a sense come to rest
and is not a concurring approximate cause of in-

11
jury, but negligence of defendant is later, intervening sole proximate cause."

Marcellin v. Osgthorpe, 336 Ped 779, 9 Utah 2d 1.
In the case of Jones v. Knudson, 400 Ped 562, 16 Utah
2d 332, this court held that if a jury could find the necessary facts for the application of the Doctrine of Last Clear
Chance that plaintiff's contributory negligence would be
irrelevant.
The case of Beckstrom v. Williams, 282 P2d 309, 3
Utah 2d 210 also holds that a negligent plaintiff may recover under the theory of Last Clear Chance. See also
Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Company, 282 P2d 335,
3 Utah 2d, 247.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein stated, plaintiffs submit that
their motion for summary judgment should have been
granted, particularly as to defendant Craig Fuhriman, and
that the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment should be reversed, or in the alternative the plaintiff should be granted a right to trial on
the issues.

J HAROLD CALL
Attorney for Appellants
23 Center Street
Heber City, Utah

